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Abstract
In Canada, the shock of the COVID-19 crisis drove up bid-ask spreads on Government of
Canada (GoC) bonds. The Bank of Canada (BoC) announced the Government Bond Purchase
Program (GBPP) to support the functioning of its government bond market, support other
market liquidity tools, and replace the BoC’s long-standing fiscal agent activities. The GBPP
conducted multi-rate reverse auctions with primary dealers to purchase GoC bonds in the
secondary market. The GBPP purchased bonds across the yield curve but concentrated on
two- and five-year tenors. In June 2020, with CAD 64.7 billion (USD 48 billion) outstanding,
the BoC announced that the program’s purpose had shifted to quantitative easing (QE). The
GBPP continued well after the GoC market calmed and, in October 2021, the BoC ended QE,
leaving the program to conduct regular liquidity management.
Keywords: Canada, COVID-19 pandemic, GBPP, GoC bonds, market liquidity, QE

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering market support programs in response to COVID-19. Cases are available from the Journal
of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
Key Terms

The spread of COVID-19, and public
health measures designed to contain it,
caused stress in Canada’s financial
markets. In response, the Bank of Canada
(BoC) intervened to contain and ease
stress in several markets (see Runkel
2021). On March 12, the BoC expanded its
repurchases—termed buybacks—of GoC
securities that the BoC had long
conducted as the government’s fiscal
agent (BoC 2012). However, bid-ask
spreads on GoC securities remained high.
Insurers sold government bonds in large
quantities to rebalance their portfolios,
driving bid-ask spreads on GoC bonds
higher (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 11).
Moreover, the BoC noticed yields rising in
government-guaranteed markets, a sign
of liquidity strains rather than asset
quality concerns. The BoC worried that
liquidity strains could affect the efficacy
of its and the GoC’s other measures to
generate credit for households and
businesses (Poloz and Wilkins 2020).

Purpose: “to address strains in the Government of
Canada bond market, and to enhance the
effectiveness of other actions taken to support core
funding markets. More recently, as market
conditions improved, the focus of the GBPP has
shifted to supporting the resumption of growth in
output and employment” (BoC 2020a)

On March 27, the BoC announced it would
increase GoC bond purchases further by
launching the Government Bond Purchase
Program (GBPP). The GBPP conducted
reverse
auctions
with
authorized
government
securities
distributors,
mostly primary dealers, to purchase GoC
bonds in the secondary market.
Distributors could submit up to five bids
for themselves and five on behalf of their
customers. The auctions were multi-rate,
meaning that the BoC satisfied bids
offering the lowest prices first, until the
allotment was exhausted. At the start of
its operations, the GBPP allotted about

Launch Dates

Announced: March 27,
2020

Operational Date

April 1, 2020

End Date

Changed to quantitative
easing in June 2020

Legal Authority

Bank of Canada Act,
18(c)

Source(s) of Funding

Bank of Canada balance
sheet

Administrators

Bank of Canada

Overall Size

No fixed ceiling

Purchased Assets

Secondary-market
Government of Canada
bonds of all tenors

Peak Utilization

CAD 64.7 billion on June
22, 2021

CAD 5 billion (USD 3.7 billion)3 weekly,
which it funded by creating reserves in
the accounts of securities distributors
(BoC 2020b; BoC 2020d).
The GBPP’s mandate shifted after the
panic in March calmed. On June 22, 2020,
the BoC governor labeled the GBPP as

3
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quantitative easing (QE) (Macklem 2020). The program had CAD 64.7 billion outstanding,
mostly in two-, five- and 10-year tenors, as shown in Figure 1 (BoC 2020–2021). The GBPP
continued until October 2021, when the BoC ended QE, leaving the GBPP only as a
replacement for its older cash-management operations.
Figure 1: Securities Purchased by the GBPP

Source: BoC 2020–2021.

Summary Evaluation
The bid-ask spreads on GoC securities had begun falling the week before the GBPP was
announced and continued to fall after (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 11). BoC staff research
finds that the announcement of the GBPP decreased GoC bond yields by an average of 10
basis points (bps), most of which the BoC attributed to signaling. As shown in Figure 2,
Arora et al. (2021) estimate the effect at about 15 bps for securities with remaining
maturities of two or fewer years, less than 10 bps for securities with remaining maturities
of more than six years, and negligible for bonds with more than 20 years remaining. As for
the effect of continuing purchases on yields, BoC staff estimate small effects—less than 1
bp—for most maturities. Moreover, the study finds that this effect faded after several days.
The study does not consider whether the program impacted bid-ask spreads or the depth
of the GoC market.
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Context: Canada 2019–2020

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$1,778.4 billion in 2019
$1,777.1 billion in 2020
$46,327 in 2019
$43,258 in 2020
Data for 2019:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2020:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AA+
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
84.2% in 2019
84.5% in 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Yes, in 2019
Yes, in 2020

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The GBPP sought to preserve market functioning and supplant the
BoC’s fiscal agent activities before it transitioned to a QE program in June 2020.
The GBPP started with two purposes: to support the functioning of the GoC bond market
and to replace some technical liquidity management operations. Later in 2020, the BoC
added a new mandate for quantitative easing.
First, the GBPP supported the functioning of the GoC bond market by narrowing bid-ask
spreads on GoC bonds and providing a buyer for less-liquid bond issues. When the program
was announced, BoC officials fielded questions from journalists who wondered if the GBPP
was a form of quantitative easing. Governor Poloz emphasized that the central bank would
label programs as QE if it were implementing a program for such purpose. Poloz
acknowledged that GBPP and QE were “closely related” and shared methods. However, he
said they had separate ends and stated that market functioning and price clearing were the
GBPP’s original objectives (Poloz and Wilkins 2020).
Second, the GBPP permanently replaced the BoC’s long-standing bond buyback operations.
The first of these operations fell under the BoC’s role as fiscal agent to the GoC, a role that
sought to ensure GoC accounts had enough liquidity to meet daily needs (BoC 2020c).
These operations tried to smooth the redemptions of government bonds by purchasing
short-dated securities that would mature on dates when many other securities would also
mature (BoC 2012, 1). The BoC said that the GBPP would lend “significant support to the
liquidity and efficiency of the government bond market, reducing the need for these fiscal
agent operations” (BoC 2020c). The other buyback operations aimed to improve the
liquidity of the government bond market by purchasing bonds from less-liquid issues or
swapping those with bonds from more-liquid issues. The BoC had conducted these
operations since at least 1998 (Gravelle 1998, 10–17). The BoC did not signal why it chose
to adopt the GBPP in favor of these buybacks.
On June 22, 2020, the new BoC governor, Tiff Macklem—appointed June 3, 2020—signaled
that the purpose of GoC bond purchases had shifted. His speech referred to the GBPP as
macroeconomic stimulus and labeled it as QE. Subsequently, the BoC described the GBPP’s
mission as “supporting the resumption of growth in output and employment” (BoC 2020a).
On October 27, 2021, the BoC announced that it would stop QE but maintain the GBPP at its
current size, then CAD 290 billion, by reinvesting maturing bonds (BoC 2021c).
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Figure 2: Yield Change and Purchase Amounts for GoC Securities of Various
Maturities

Sources: Arora et al. 2021; benchmark refers to bonds designated by financial markets as reference points for
performance comparisons (BoC 2021a, 29).

2. Part of a Package: The GBPP also supported the BoC’s other programs.
The GBPP also lent support to the rest of the Bank’s programs. Starting March 13, the BoC
launched programs to purchase corporate debt, provincial debt, and mortgage-backed
securities, and to enter term repurchase agreements, while the GoC announced a large
package of fiscal measures (see Department of Finance 2020; Runkel 2021). These markets
faced much more acute pressure than the GoC bond market. Governor Poloz argued that “a
firefighter has never been criticized for using too much water” (Poloz and Wilkins 2020,
37:15). BoC officials had explained that closing bid-ask spreads in GoC bonds would relieve
pressure in other markets as investors reallocated their portfolios in search of yield.
3. Legal Authority: The Bank of Canada Act explicitly allowed the BoC to purchase
Government of Canada securities.
Section 18(c) of the Bank of Canada Act (1985) explicitly authorized the BoC to purchase
securities issued by the Government of Canada.
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4. Governance: The Governing Council approved the policy.
The BoC Governing Council—composed of the Governor, Senior Deputy Governor, and four
Deputy Governors—met virtually each day throughout the crisis. They decided on the path
of secondary-market purchases (Poloz and Wilkins 2020).
The Bank of Canada Act (1985, vol. c. B-2, sec. 28) also enabled the Minister of Finance to
appoint auditors of the BoC and to require that those auditors report on bank affairs to the
Minister “from time to time”. The Bank of Canada Act required the BoC to publish its policy
allowing outright transactions in the Canada Gazette. It was then required to wait seven
days before enacting its policy.
5. Administration: The BoC administered the GBPP; however, it is not clear how it
organized its staff to implement the facility.
The GBPP purchased securities directly from primary dealers through the CDSX platform.
6. Communication: BoC communications were light after a press conference
announcing the GBPP.
During the press conference in which the BoC announced the GBPP, Governor Stephen
Poloz and Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins walked through the policy and parsed its
objectives. The contents of this press conference, which set out the GBPP’s purpose, are
discussed further in Key Design Decision No. 1, Purpose.
Following this press conference, the BoC spoke little about the GBPP until Macklem’s June
22, 2020, speech announcing that the program would continue as the country’s first-ever
attempt at QE. Thereafter, BoC officials and official documents reflected the change by
referring to the program as QE (Beaudry 2020, 2; BoC 2020e, 28).
7. Disclosure: The BoC published transaction-level data and the GBPP’s aggregate
purchases.
The BoC was required to publish its balance sheets but not any more granular data (Bank
of Canada Act 1985, vol. c. B-2, sec. 29). The BoC exceeded the requirements imposed by
Section 29 by publishing details of each purchase on its website, including size, time, and
price paid (BoC 2020–2021).
8. Use of SPV: The GBPP did not use an SPV.
No documents suggest that the BoC used a special-purpose vehicle to administer the GBPP.
9. Size: The GBPP’s size was not predetermined.
The BoC committed to purchasing CAD 5 billion weekly when it announced the GBPP (BoC
2020b). In practice, its weekly purchases averaged CAD 4 billion and varied between
CAD 1 billion and CAD 8 billion. This average was an order of magnitude larger than the
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BoC’s previous purchases of government bonds, as shown in Figure 3 (BoC 2020–2021).
Before COVID-19, the BoC averaged purchases in the hundreds of millions of dollars and
had never purchased more than CAD 2.2 billion in any single week (BoC 2001–2020; BoC
2002–2020; BoC 2020–2021). The GBPP added substantial size to the BoC’s balance sheet
and reflected a change in appetite favoring outright purchases over repurchase
agreements. As of October 2021, when the BoC ended new net purchases of GoC securities,
the GBPP had CAD 290 billion outstanding.
Figure 3: Size of Weekly GBPP Purchases Compared to Pre-COVID-19 Buyback
Programs

Sources: BoC 2001–2020; BoC 2002–2020; BoC 2020–2021.

10. Source(s) of Funding: The Bank of Canada funded purchases by expanding its
balance sheet.
To fund the GBPP, the BoC credited government securities distributors’ settlement
balances (BoC 2020b). The GBPP was indemnified by the GoC: the government agreed to
cover losses and, in return, it received any gains (BoC 2021b, 21).
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11. Eligible Institutions: Authorized government securities distributors and, by
proxy, their customers participated in the GBPP.
The BoC allowed Canadian government securities distributors4 and their customers to
participate in the GBPP (BoC 2020d). Distributors submitted bids on their own behalf and
on behalf of their customers (BoC 2020d). Documents do not suggest which distributors
and customers participated in the auctions.
12. Auction or Standing Facility: The GBPP conducted reverse multi-rate auctions.
A day before each operation, the BoC announced its size, timing, and the eligible GoC
securities. On the day of the operation, participants submitted bids specifying up to five
bids for the securities distributor and five bids on behalf of each of their customers. Each
bid identified the security to be sold, the yield a bidder was willing to accept, and the
amount a bidder would sell in CAD 1,000 increments above CAD 1 million. The BoC then
accepted bids starting with the highest yield rates until the accepted bids exhausted the
total allotment. Successful bidders received the rate they offered (BoC 2020d). Figure 4
shows sample results of GBPP auctions on April 1 and 2, 2020.

The set of government securities distributors, which are firms authorized to participate in government
securities auctions, was slightly larger than the set of primary dealers due to internal divisions between bank
affiliates that distribute Treasury bills and marketable bonds, and a few independent distributors not
included in the list of primary dealers. The following institutions were distributors: Bank of Montreal (BMO);
Beacon Securities; Canaccord Genuity; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC); Casgrain & Company;
CTI Capital Securities; Desjardins; HSBC; Laurentian Bank; Merrill Lynch; National Bank of Canada (NBC);
Odlum Brown; Royal Bank of Canada (RBC); Scotiabank/Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS); Sherbrooke Street
Capital (SSC); Toronto-Dominion (TD) Bank.
4
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Figure 4: Sample results of GBPP auctions
Auction date

ISIN

4/1/2020
4/1/2020
4/1/2020
4/1/2020
4/1/2020
4/1/2020
4/2/2020
4/2/2020
4/2/2020
4/2/2020
4/2/2020
4/2/2020

CA135087H987
CA135087J546
CA135087B451
CA135087J967
CA135087D507
CA135087VH40
CA135087E679
CA135087F825
CA135087VW17
CA135087H235
CA135087WL43
CA135087XG49

Amount
(CAD)

purchased Cutoff
(%)
235 million
192 million
225 million
250 million
0
98 million
37 million
366 million
171 million
80 million
131 million
15 million

yield Term
0.480
0.500
0.496
0.519
NA
0.531
0.510
0.535
0.553
0.537
0.611
0.808

5 years
5 years
5 years
5 years
5 years
5 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years

Source: BoC 2020–2021

13. Loan or Purchase: The Bank of Canada purchased securities outright from
distributors through CDSX.
Successful bidders delivered GoC bonds through the CDSX platform, owned and operated
by Clearing and Depository Services (CDS). Settlement occurred two days later.
14. Eligible Assets: The GBPP purchased GoC bonds.
Before each operation, the BoC announced a basket of eligible securities, usually eight to 10
bonds per tenor, that it would purchase (BoC 2020d; BoC 2020–2021). Only GoC securities
were eligible; provincial debt was not. Sometimes participants sold the full allotment of
these securities, and sometimes they didn’t sell any—rarely did they sell anywhere in
between. As shown in Figure 5, the GBPP primarily purchased securities in tenors of two
years, followed by five-year and 10-year bonds (BoC 2020–2021). As Figure 1 shows, the
GBPP stopped purchasing bonds with tenors less than two years in fall 2020.
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Figure 5: Outstanding GBPP Purchases by Tenor

Source: (BoC 2020–2021)

15. Purchase Price: Bids could be any price.
Bidders were not subject to a minimum price or maximum yield.
16. Haircuts: The GBPP did not impose haircuts.
As a bond purchase program, the GBPP took no collateral and therefore imposed no
haircuts.
17. Interest Rates: The GBPP accepted the results of its auctions.
Auction data indicate that the GBPP purchased bonds at the price resulting from its
auctions.
18. Fees: The BoC did not charge any fees.
No documents suggest that the BoC charged fees to issuers of securities that it purchased.
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19. Term/Repayment: Assets matured at their scheduled coupon date.
The GBPP did not amend the scheduled maturities of assets it purchased.
20. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: Participants could not collude with
each other.
The BoC prohibited bidders from colluding, though it did not announce any mechanisms to
enforce this rule (BoC 2020d).
21. Regulatory Relief: Participants received no regulatory relief when participating
in the GBPP.
No documents suggest that distributors received relief from capital or liquidity regulations
as a result of participating in the GBPP.
22. International Coordination: The BoC did not coordinate with other countries for
the GBPP.
Though several countries launched government bond-buying programs, none were
connected to the Canadian market.
23. Duration: The GBPP became a QE program in June 2020 and continued solely as a
cash-management program in October 2021.
On June 22, 2020, the BoC governor labeled the GBPP as quantitative easing (QE), signaling
the end of the GBPP as a tool to provide market liquidity during the March panic (Macklem
2020). The governor cited the economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis as he spoke about
the GBPP, rather than its efforts to replenish market liquidity. The GBPP continued as both
a QE and cash-management tool until October 2021, when the BoC ended QE.
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